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ANNUAL SURVEY OF
CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES LAW:
Recent Developments
Edited by RALPH J. ROHNER*

This feature of the annual survey briefly reviews a number of areas in order
to highlight significant developments and to present the current status of
pending regulatory proposals.
I. ADJUSTABLE RATE CREDIT: By John L. Culhane, Jr.**
A. Introduction

In an effort to cope with the fluctuations in money market rates and with the
eventual removal of rate controls on savings accounts and savings certificates,
many consumer lenders are turning to variable rate loans. By varying interest
rates in accordance with the movements of certain indices, these lenders hope
to guarantee that the return on their assets will exceed their liabilities.'
However, since variable rate loans are still a relatively new phenomenon, the
operational and legal problems attendant on their use are still being identified
and resolved. 2
B. Federal Developments

At the federal level the primary focus has been on variable or adjustable
rate mortgage loans. In quick succession the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC), the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB),' and then
the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA)5 adopted adjustable rate
mortgage loan regulations. Moreover, to give national banks, federal savings
and loan associations, and federal credit unions the flexibility to develop their
own programs, all three agencies purported to preempt state laws restricting
*Member of the Maryland bar.
*Member of the Virginia bar.
I. E. Pace, J. Lockart, & A. Sale, Variable Rate Consumer Lending 1 (1981).
2. For a comprehensive review of these problems see Federal Home Loan Bank Board,
Alternative Mortgage Instruments Research Study (1977).
3. 46 Fed. Reg. 18,932-47 (1981) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 29).
4. 46 Fed. Reg. 24,148-53 (1981) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-4a). These regulations
replaced existing regulations authorizing the use of renegotiable rate mortgages, 12 C.F.R.
§ 545.6-4(a) (1981), and variable rate mortgages, 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-4(c) (1981).
5. 46 Fed. Reg. 38,669-72 (1981) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 701.21-6B). Unlike the OCC
and the FHLBB, at the same time the NCUA also adopted regulations expressly permitting
variable rate consumer loans, such as automobile loan and lines of credit. 46 Fed. Reg. 38,672-76
(1981) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 701.21-2).
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the ability or right of the institutions under their control to offer adjustable
rate mortgage loans.6
A comparison of these regulations suggests that the adjustable rate mortgage loans made by national banks, federal savings and loan associations, and
federal credit unions should have a number of elements in common. All three
regulations apply only to home mortgage loans.7 All permit adjustments to the
interest rate through changes in the payment amount and the rate of
amortization (or both).' All permit negative amortization. 9 In all cases, a
decrease in the index generally requires a downward adjustment of the
interest rate.' ° With some variations, prepayment penalties are essentially
prohibited." In all cases it appears that the loans may contain due-on-sale
clauses.' 2 Notwithstanding these similarities, a closer examination indicates
that each succeeding regulation provides more flexibility than its predecessor.
The OCC regulations are clearly the most stringent. Unlike the other
regulations, the OCC regulations do not permit extension of the loan term.' 3
Only three indices are permitted: (1) the monthly average contract rate
charged by all lenders on mortgage loans for previously occupied homes; (2)
the monthly average yield on U.S. Treasury securities adjusted to a constant
maturity of three years; and (3) the monthly average yield of weekly auction
rates on U.S. Treasury bills with a maturity of six months." Adjustments may
only be made at regular intervals (which must be at least six months long)' 5
6. 12C.F.R. § 29.3(OCC); 12C.F.R.§ 545.6-4a(a)(2) (FHLBB); 12C.F.R.§ 701.21-6B(b)
(2) (NCUA). However, the authority of the OCC to issue adjustable rate mortgage regulations
that preempt state laws has been challenged. Conference of State Bank Supervisors v. Lord, No.
81-1591 (D.D.C. filed July 10, 1981).
7. 12 C.F.R. § 29.2 (OCC); 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-2(a) (1981) (FHLBB); 12 C.F.R. §§ 701.216B(l) (NCUA) (by reference to 12 C.F.R. § 701.21-6(b)(1) (1981)).
8. 12 C.F.R. § 29.5(d) (OCC); 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-4a(b)(l) (FHLBB); 12 C.F.R. § 701.216B(d)(1) (NCUA).
9. 12C.F.R.§ 29.5(d)(2) (OCC); 12C.F.R.§ 545.6-4a(b)(2) (FHLBB); 12C.F.R.§ 701.216B(c)(l) (NCUA).
10. 12 C.F.R. §§ 29.5(c) (2), (3) (OCC); 12 C.F.R. § 701.21-6B(e)(2) (NCUA). In the case
of the FH LBB downward adjustments appear to be required by virtue of the fact that changes in
the index must correspond directly to changes in the interest rate. 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-4a(c)(I).
The model disclosure prepared by the FHLBB contains a statement that decreases are mandatory. 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-4a(f).
II. 12 C.F.R. § 29.6 (OCC); 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-4a(b)(4) (FHLBB). In the case of NCUA,
the prohibition is statutory. 12 U.S.C. § 1757(5)(A)(viii). (Supp. IV 1980).
12. This is stated explicitly in the OCC regulations. 12 C.F.R. § 29.7. The NCUA regulations
require the use of the clause by reference to NCUA regulations governing the use of the due-onsale clause. 12 C. F.R. § 701.21-6B(b)(1); 46 Fed. Reg. 38,676 (1981) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R.
§ 701.21-6(d).
In the case of the FH LBB, the FHLBB regulations permitting the use of the due-on-sale clause
appear to apply with equal force to fixed rate and adjustable rate mortgage loans. 12 C.F.R.
§ 545.8-3(0 (1981).
13. See 12 C.F.R. § 29.5(d). This is apparently due to the fact that home mortgage loans
granted by national banks must be repaid within a period of not more than 30 years. 12 U.S.C.
§ 371(a)([) (1976).
14. 12 C.F.R. § 29.4.
15. 12 C.F.R. § 29.5(b).
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and the maximum interest rate change may not exceed one percentage point
for every six-month period between adjustments (moreover, in no event may a
single interest rate adjustment exceed five percentage points). 6 Negative
amortization is limited to one percent of the principal outstanding at the
beginning of the fixed-payment period multiplied by the number of six-month
intervals within the fixed-payment period (although in no event may the
amount of negative amortization exceed 10 percent of the principal outstanding at the beginning of the period). 7 Decreases in the index that are not
translated into changes in the interest rate must be carried over to the next
rate change date (unless they are offset by a subsequent movement in the
index).' 8 A disclosure form must be given to a prospective borrower when
written information is provided concerning residential mortgage loans or
when a loan application form is provided, whichever occurs first. 9 Moreover, a
notification must be given at least thirty but not more than forty-five days
before any interest rate change takes effect.20
By contrast, the FHLBB regulations are more flexible. The FHLBB
regulations permit extension of the loan to forty years. 2' Further, any index
may be used as long as it is readily verifiable by the borrower and is beyond the
control of the lender.2" There are no limitations on the frequency of rate
changes, although as with the OCC regulations, notice of a payment adjustment must be given at least thirty but not more than forty-five days prior to
the adjustment.22 There is no limitation on the maximum amount of any one
adjustment24 nor are there any limitations on the amount of negative amortization.2" Although a disclosure is required, it only has to be given on request or
at the time an application form is provided.26
The NCUA regulations are essentially the same as the FHLBB regulations.
27
The NCUA regulations permit extension of the loan to forty years. Again,
any index may be used as long as it is readily verifiable by the borrower and is
beyond the control of the lender.2" Adjustments may be made as frequently as
monthly.29 There are no limitations on the amount of any one adjustment nor
16. Id.
17. 12 C.F.R. § 29.5(d)(2).
18. 12 C.F.R. § 29.5(c)(4).
19. 12 C.F.R. § 29.8(a).
20. 12 C.F.R. § 29.8(b).
21. 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-4a(b)(l).
22. 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-4a(c)(2).
23. 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-4a(e).
24. The FHLBB regulations are intentionally silent on this point. 46 Fed. Reg. 24,149-50
(1981).
25. 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-4a(b)(2). Again, the FHLBB has intentionally refrained from placing
limits on the amount of negative amortization. 46 Fed. Reg. 24,150 (1981).
26. 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-4a(f).
27. At the time the loan is granted, however, the initial maturity must be between 12-30 years.
12 C.F.R. § 701.21-6B(b)(1), (d)(2).
28. 12 C.F.R. § 701.21-6B(e)(l).
29. 12 C.F.R. § 701.21-6B(d)(3).
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on the amount of negative amortization. But unlike the FHLBB regulations,
NCUA requires merely that disclosures be made in accordance with the
Truth in Lending Act and regulation Z; it does not require that a notice be
given prior to any rate adjustment. 3°
As a practical matter, the differences among the three regulations may at
this point be of academic interest only. The Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation3 ' and the Federal National Mortgage Association" may have
effectively minimized these differences by limiting the types of adjustable rate
mortgage loans they will purchase to ten separate plans.
C. State Developments
Some states have enacted statutes to authorize the use of variable rate
loans, either directly or by removing prior statutory impediments to their
use.'3 In other states, state banking commissioners and other officials have
reportedly issued enabling regulations." In the absence of statutory or
regulatory authorization, variable rate loans are apparently legal as long as
changes in the interest rate are made in compliance with applicable provisions
of state law-although it is not always possible to identify the applicable
provisions of law in advance of litigation.
Perhaps because most of the cases to date have involved commercial
transactions, contrary to expectations a distinction has not yet developed
between internal and external indices. Although the index is not always
challenged directly, internal indices such as the institution's savings account
rate,3" its cost of funds, 36 and its own prime rate37 have all appeared in reported
30. 46 Fed. Reg. 38,671 (1981). The lack of uniform disclosures has been strongly criticized.
Comptroller General, New Mortgages for Financing Homes Need Uniform & Comprehensive
Consumer Safeguards (1981) (GAO Report No. CED-81-53).
31. [1981] 22 Wash. Fin. Rep. (BNA) A-9, T-1.
32. [1981] 26 Wash. Fin. Rep. (BNA) A-19, T-4.
33. E.g., Ch. 274, 1981 Cal. Legis. Serv. 955 (West); Act. No. 640, 1981 La. Sess. Law Serv.
1019 (West) (to be codified as La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 6:25.1); Va. Code § 6.1-3.37.B(ii) (Cum
Supp. 1981),
34. E.g., [1981] 19 Wash. Fin. Rep. (BNA) A-4 (Connecticut); [1981] 29 Wash. Fin. Rep.
(BNA) A-16 (Massachusetts).
35. Vanguard Investments v. Central California Fed. Say. Ass'n, 68 Cal. App. 3d 950, 137
Cal. Rptr. 719 (1977); Powell v. Central California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 59 Cal. App. 3d 540,
130 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1976). In Vanguard Investments the transaction survived a challenge that the
index has been fraudulently manipulated. 68 Cal. App. 3d at 963-64, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 727, In
Powell the transaction survived a challenge that the variable interest rate provision was illusory.
59 Cal. App. 3d at 549-50, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 640-41.
36. McConnell v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 578 P.2d 1375, 146 Cal. Rptr. 371
(1978); O'Brien v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 90 Wash. 2d 680, 586 P.2d 830 (1978).
37. In re Le Blanc, 622 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1980) (Louisiana law); Constitution Bank & Trust
Co. v. Robinson, 179 Conn. 232, 425 A.2d 1268 (1979); State Nat'l Bank v. Dick, 164 Conn. 523,
325 A.2d 235 (1973); Sailboat Apartment Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage & Realty Trust,
363 So. 2d 564 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). Although the prime rate survived direct challenges in
Le Blanc, where it was held to be sufficiently definite to meet a parol evidence statute requiring
interest to be "fixed in writing," 522 F.2d at 878-79, and in Robinson, where it was held to be
sufficiently definite for contract purposes, 179 Conn. at
-,
425 A.2d at 1270-71, further
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decisions. Only when the rate has been "at the lender's discretion" has the
transaction been overturned because of the index."8 External indices, such as
0
the prime rate of an institution other than the lender,39 employment," or
41
residence, have largely gone unchallenged.
In contrast, usury-related allegations have frequently been made. One
question that has been raised is whether negative amortization will run afoul
of state laws prohibiting compounding. 42 Another question that has been
raised is whether an interest rate ceiling will have a special impact on a
variable rate loan. At least the following possibilities exist: the lender may not
collect any interest above the legal maximum; 3 the lender may not collect any
interest above the legal maximum but may provide for the recapture of
4
uncollectible interest in the event the rate drops below the legal maximum;"
the lender may collect interest above the legal maximum so long as the parties
contract in good faith and the total interest collected does not exceed the legal
maximum at any particular time;4" and the lender may continue to collect
interest above the legal maximum as long as there is a reduction in the final
payment or a recomputation and refund of any excess interest at the time the
loan is repaid. 6
Other state law problems have also been identified and addressed. Different
states have come down on opposite sides of the questions of whether variable
rate loans will violate provisions requiring level payments or prohibiting
balloon payments 7 and whether they will violate laws limiting interest rate
increases on refinancing.48 Additional questions have been raised concerning
challenges are likely to be made in the future. See Staff of House Comm. on Banking, Finance &
Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., An Analysis of Prime Rate Lending Practices at the Ten
Largest United States Banks (Comm. Print 97-2).
38. Ellis Nat'l Bank v. Davis, 359 So. 2d 466 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). See also La. Att'y
Gen. Op. No. 81-230 (1981), cited in 5 Cons. Cred. Guide (CCH) 98,754. (The opinion has
apparently since been overturned by statute, Act No. 640, 1981 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1019 (West)
(to be codified as La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 6:25.1)).
39. Kin-Ark Corp. v. Boyles. 593 F.2d 361 (10th Cir. 1979) (Texas law); Ryder Truck Rental,
Inc. v. Kramer, 263 Ark. 169, 563 S.W.2d 451 (1978); Arneill Ranch v. Petit, 64 Cal. App. 3d
277, 134 Cal. Rptr. 456 (1977); Associated East Mortgage Co. v. Highland Park, Inc., 172 Conn.
395, 374 A.2d 1070 (1977).
40. Moore v. Canal Nat'l Bank, 409 A.2d 679 (Me. 1979).
41. Katz v. Bank of California, 640 F.2d 1024 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3248
(1981).
42. See McConnell v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., supra note 36.
43. See Arneill Ranch v. Petit, supra note 39.
44. See Kin-Ark Corp. v. Boyles, supra note 39. It appears from the decision that this might
be acceptable under Texas law on the grounds that the recapture provision is akin to a savings
clause.
45. See McConnell v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., supra note 36.
46. See O'Brien v. Shearson Hayden Stone Inc., supra note 36.
47. Compare Moore v. Canal Nat'l Bank, supra note 40, at 686 n.10 (prohibitions on balloon
payments do not apply to variable rate loans) with S.C. Dept. Cons. Aff. Ad. Interpretation No.
97,252 (prohibitions do
1.108-8017 (Dec. 19, 1980), cited in 5 Cons. Cred. Guide (CCH)
apply).
48. Compare Moore v. Canal Nat'l Bank, supra note 40, at 684-86 Op. Me. Superintendent
97,383
Bur. Cons. Prot. No. 45 (May 16, 1980), Cited in 5 Cons. Cred. Guide (CCH)
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continued lien priority," negotiability," and the disclosure requirements of
state laws."
D. Conclusion
As can be seen from the federal and state developments, any lender's move
to variable rates involves complex choices. Since variable rate consumer loans
are relatively new, the legal issues that arise with their use are by no means
well settled. With so many questions unanswered, more litigation seems likely
for the future.
II. CONSUMER LEASING by John G. Cooluris*
Leasing has become a popular alternative to purchasing as a means for
consumers to obtain the possession and use of automobiles, furniture, and
other durable goods. Consumer lease transactions are not homogenous, but
rather have become highly differentiated as to product type; market place
competition continues to fuel innovation. As has been the experience with
other forms of consumer financial services, the law has not fully anticipated
the advent of consumer leasing.
This article summarizes the key federal consumer protection law developments of 1981 which primarily relate to consumer leasing. Excluded, therefore, is an analysis of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 198152 and other
important federal income tax law developments affecting lessors' ownership
tax benefits and ultimately the pricing of many types of leases. Also excluded
is a discussion of the movement in some quarters to develop a new article of
(prohibitions do not apply), with S.C. Depart. Cons. Aff. Ad. Interpretation No. 1.108-8017
(Dec. 19, 1980), cited in 5 Cons. Cred. Guide (CCH)
97,252 (prohibitions do apply).
49. Increases in the index are implemented either by adjusting the interest rate, making
additions to principal, extending the loan term, or a combination of all three. In the case of a
mortgage loan, all of these options raise questions concerning continued lien priority. Although
there have been no judicial developments to date, it seems to be generally assumed that if the
changes are mandatory, the note and mortgage accurately describe the variable rate feature, and
the proper documents are recorded, then the case law on future advances will support continued
priority. For a more detailed discussion, see P. Barnett, Alternative Mortgage Instruments: How
to Maintain Secured Lender Status, 96 Banking Law J. 6 (1979). Nonetheless, at least two states
have acted to remove any uncertainties by amending their statutes dealing with foreclosures. Act
No. 641, 1981 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1020 (West) (to be codified as La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 6:72); Va
Code § 55-59(5a) (1981).
50. There is some question whether a variable rate loan will be negotiable because of the
requirement of § 3-104(l)(b) of the Uniform Commercial Code that the instrument contain an
order to pay a "sum certain." At least one state has specifically amended its statutes to provide
that a variable rate loan will be negotiable. Act. No. 640, 1981 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1019 (West)
(to be codified as La. Rev. Stat. Am. § 6:25.1).
51. Op. Me. Superintendent Bur. Cons. Prot. No. 55 (July 21, 1981), Cited in 5 Cons. Cred.
Guide (CCH)
97,082 (how to make disclosures on variable rate open end loans); Op. Me.
Superintendent Bur. Cons. Prot. No. 45 (May 16, 1980), cited in 5 Cons. Cred. Guide (CCH)
97,383 (change in terms notices not required before raising interest rates on variable rate open
end loans).
*Member of the California bar.
52. Pub. L. No. 97-34, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
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the Uniform Commercial Code addressing personal property leases.5 3 Finally,
the potential impact of the Federal Trade Commission's recently promulgated
trade rule on used cars, which affects lease as well as purchase transactions, is
not covered here. These excluded topics are nonetheless "must review"
matters for practitioners, regulators, and others involved with the legal
problems of consumer leasing.
A. Regulation M
When Congress enacted the Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform
Act5" in 1980, the provisions of the Consumer Leasing Act55 were left largely
untouched.5 6 As discussed in last year's annual survey,57 on the basis of its
regulatory powers, the Federal Reserve Board proposed a variety of changes
in the leasing provisions of regulation Z in its May 198058 and November
1980"9 drafts of the revised regulation Z. The May 1980 draft would have
effected major changes and necessitated numerous revisions in existing
disclosure forms.
In the November 1980 draft, the Board expressed the policy decision not to
adopt any regulatory changes requiring lessors to alter their existing lease
disclosure forms. The Board elaborated on its desire to simplify the leasing
regulations but concluded that such efforts should await congressional action. 61 Within that framework, the Board proposed a number of both technical
and substantive refinements to the existing regulation, including the creation
of significantly clearer rules regarding renegotiations and lease term extensions.
The Board surprised many in the consumer leasing community with its
ultimate decision to remove all leasing provisions from regulation Z and to
place them, without substantive change, in a new regulation M. 61 With one
minor exception, 6 regulation M, which became effective April 1, 1981, is
virtually identical to the leasing provisions contained in regulation Z that
53. For an excellent overview of this subject, see Mooney, Personal Property Leasing: A
Challenge, 36 Bus. Law. 1605 (1981).
54. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, tit. VI, Pub. L.
No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980) (DIDMCA).
55. Pub. L. No. 94-240 90 Stat. 257 (1976).
56. Although neither disclosure simplification nor review of consumer lessees' substantive
protections were undertaken, Congress did extend to leasing all or some of the new provisions
applicable to other consumer credit transactions regarding model disclosure forms, the effective
date of new disclosure rules, transactions involving multiple creditors or multiple consumers, and

civil liability. DIDMCA §§ 605, 611, 615.
57. O'Connor, Truth in Lending Simplification, 36 Bus. Law. 1161 (1981).
58. 45 Fed. Reg. 29,702 (1980).
59. 45 Fed. Reg. 80,648 (1980).
60. Id. at 80,689.
61. 46 Fed. Reg. 20,949 (1981), to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 213.
62. 12 C.F.R. § 213.4(c) provides that only one lessor need make the required disclosures. The
lessors may decide among themselves which one will make the disclosures. 46 Fed. Reg. at 20,950
(1981).
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expire on March 31, 1982. Compliance with regulation M therefore becomes
mandatory on April 1, 1982.
B. Official Staff Commentary to Regulation M
In October 1981, the Federal Reserve Board issued for public comment a
proposed official staff commentary to regulation M.13 The proposed commentary has been designed to incorporate the more important Board and staff
interpretations on the leasing provisions of the old regulation Z and otherwise
to provide general guidance on the requirements of regulation M. The nature
and format of the proposed commentary mimics that of the official staff
commentary to the new regulation Z.14
C. Possible Amendments to the Consumer Leasing Act
In the supplementary information accompanying regulation M, the Federal
Reserve Board indicated that it was recommending to Congress that it
consider simplifying the Consumer Leasing Act in the near future in order to
continue the process begun with the Truth in Lending Simplification and
Reform Act. 5 The Board's Division of Consumer and Community Affairs, in
its memorandum dated April 1, 1981, asked the Consumer Advisory Council
to consider a number of issues relative to amending the Act. The staff
presented a variety of issues relating to the fundamental need for the law and
the act's provisions regarding scope of coverage, transactional and advertising
disclosures, substantive consumer rights, and civil penalties. The Consumer
Advisory Council did not formulate a comprehensive response to the staffis
inquiries in 1981, although there was some concern expressed by some
members of the council at its April 15, 198 1, meeting regarding week-to-week
or month-to-month rentals of televisions and other goods. 66
Congress did not act in 1981 upon the board's recommendations to simplify
the act. However, sections 704 and 705 of S.1720, the Financial Institutions
Restructuring and Services Act of 1981, introduced on October 7, 1981, by
Senator Jake Garn, chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, would
respectively change the relation to state laws rules and civil liability provisions
of the Truth in Lending Act which apply to consumer lease transactions. 67
63. 46 Fed. Reg. 50,380 (1981).
64. 46 Fed. Reg. 50,288 (1981).
65. 46 Fed. Reg. 20,949 (1981).
66. Most of the reported decisions regarding the Consumer Leasing Act and its implementing
provisions of regulation Z have focused on week-to-week rental agreements for televisions
whereby the consumer would not be obligated to rent the television for more than a week at a
time, and in some cases, the consumer would automatically receive title after a certain time. The
cases have almost uniformly held that such transactions are not covered by the Consumer Leasing
Act (nor by the Truth in Lending Act). See Smith v. ABC Rental Systems of New Orleans, Inc.,
491 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. La. 1978), affd 618 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1980); Dodson v. Remco
Enterprises, Inc., 504 F. Supp. 540 (E.D. Va. 1980); Lemay v. Stroman's Inc., 510 F. Supp. 921
(E.D. Ark. 1981).
67. 127 Cong. Rec. S11254 (daily ed., October 7, 1981).
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D. FTC Investigation of Leasing Practices
The Federal Trade Commission announced in August 1980 that it was
proceeding with an investigation of the automobile leasing industry to
determine whether or not violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act and
the Consumer Leasing Act were occurring." The investigation has been
conducted by the FTC's Seattle regional office.
The focus of the investigation has been on lessors' practices and policies
relating to early termination charges, default charges, disposition methods,
and equity ownership in the leased property. In this regard it would appear
that the staff is concentrating its efforts on whether the limitations of section
183(b) of the Act 69 are being observed by the leasing industry. Section 183(b),
which is not covered by the Federal Reserve Board's regulations and has yet to
be judicially construed, provides that penalties or other charges for delinquency, default, or early termination may be specified in the lease but only at
an amount which is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual harm
caused by the delinquency, default, or early termination, the difficulties of
proof of loss, and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an
adequate remedy.
The FTC's findings and resulting actions in this area could prove to be
significant. As of December 1981, the FTC had neither initiated any administrative action against any lessor nor proposed any trade regulation rule
proceeding.
III. CREDIT DISCRIMINATION by James N. Rice*
Since the last annual survey 0 there have been two significant legal developments under the federal Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), 7" regulation
B, and related areas of the law. The first is the issuance by the Federal
Financial Institutions Examination Council of an interagency policy statement"3 and a supervisory enforcement policy74 regarding the enforcement of
the ECOA and the federal Fair Housing Act7 by four of the federal agencies
that have responsibility for the enforcement of these acts 76 This development,
the long anticipated response to issues originally presented in the summer of
68. Federal Trade Commission press release dated August 13, 1980.
69. 15 U.S.C. § 1687b.
*Member of the Massachusetts bar.
70. Dreyer and Rice, Annual Survey of Consumer Financial Services Law Developments,
Equal Credit Opportunity, 36 Bus. Law. 1203 (1981).
71. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-91F (1976).
72. 12 C.F.R. § 202 (1980). Regulation B is the implementing regulation under the ECOA.
73. 46 Fed. Reg. 56,500 (1981).
74. Published under a press release of the examination council dated September 14, 1981.
75. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1968).
76. The four agencies referred to in the text are the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the National Credit Union Administration,
and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.
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1978," 7 should lead to a more uniform enforcement effort by the four agencies
and to more vigorous enforcement efforts by individuals in private litigation.
The second significant development is the affirmance by the Federal Court of
Appeals of the opinion, favorable to creditors, of the District Court of New
8
Jersey in United States v. Beneficial Corporation."
A. The Interagency Policy Statement
The Interagency Policy Statement represents the agreement of the four
enforcing agencies on the broad parameters of a regulatory enforcement
strategy. The statement sets forth the basic enforcement principle that certain
ECOA violations79 will require the violating creditor to take "retrospective
action to correct the conditions resulting from the violations."8 Aside from
listing these "serious" violations of ECOA, the statement sets out statute of
limitations concepts for regulatory enforcement. In general, creditors will be
required to take corrective action only with respect to violations occurring
within twenty-four months prior to the discovery of the applicable violation by
the appropriate examining agency. Violations involving adverse action notices
will only trigger corrective action if they occurred within six months prior to
the discovery of such errors by the examining agency.The Interagency Policy
Statement closes with the admonition that it neither precludes nor requires
the use of any other administrative or private remedy available for ECOA
enforcement.
Although specifying those ECOA violations that will give rise to required
corrective action, the Interagency Policy Statement does not describe the
nature of the corrective action that will be required when these "serious"
violations are detected by bank examiners. This description of the types of
required affirmative action appears in the supervisory enforcement policy.
Although taking pains to indicate that each bank examining agency retains
discretion in fashioning appropriate remedies, the supervisory enforcement
policy makes clear that all of the four agencies have agreed that creditors that
have made "serious" ECOA violations will be required to adopt written
ECOA compliance programs. The supervisory enforcement policy encourages, but does not require, agencies to require violating institutions to adopt
77. 43 Fed. Reg. 29,256 (1978).
78. United States v. Beneficial Corporation, No. 81-1235 (3d Cir. 1981 ). This decision afirms
the opinion appearing at 492 F. Supp. 682 (D.N.J. 1980). The district court opinion was
thoroughly discussed in Dreyer & Rice, supra note 70.
79. The ECOA violations categorized as serious by the Interagency Policy Statement are
discouragement of applicants in violation of the Fair Housing Act or § 202.4 or § 202.5(a) of
regulation B; the use of discriminatory credit criteria in violation of the Fair Housing Act or
§§ 202.4-202.7 of regulation B; imposing different terms on a prohibited basis in violation of the
Fair Housing Act or § 202.4 or § 202.6(b) of regulation B; requiring cosigners and guarantors on
a prohibited basis in violation of § 202.7(d) of regulation B; failing to furnish separate credit
histories as required by § 202.10 of regulation B; and failing to provide adequate adverse action
notifications under § 202.9 of regulation B.
80. 46 Fed. Reg. at 56,501.
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employee training programs, internal control programs, written appraisal
standards, and written loan policies.
The major portion of the supervisory enforcement policy lists each of the
"serious" ECOA violations followed by suggested remedial action designed to
correct the conditions created by the violation. In this fashion, the supervisory
enforcement policy recommends to each bank examining agency that creditors that have discouraged applicants on a prohibited basis 8' be required to
implement in-house training procedures and marketing techniques designed
to solicit applications from discouraged groups. Those creditors that have
been found to have used discriminatory credit criteria and credit evaluation
techniques" will be required to notify affected customers and solicit new
credit applications. The credit standards to be used in such a required
reapplication program are the earlier credit standards (without their discriminatory elements) or the current credit standards, whichever are more favorable to that customer. Creditors found to have made ECOA violations in the
credit approval process may be required to refund application fees, pay for
prepayment penalties on alternative credit arrangements, and notify credit
bureaus of the inaccuracy of the previously reported rejection. If the creditor's
violation involves the imposition of more onerous terms on a discriminatory
basis,83 the supervisory enforcement policy calls for the identification of all
such loans by the creditor and the delivery of a notification by the creditor to
affected customers within sixty days of the corrective action to be taken by the
creditor. If the violation involves nondirect cost terms such as the size of down
payments or the amount of required collateral, the violating creditor may be
required to offer to change the terms of the account to more favorable
"nondiscriminatory" terms. If the violation entails actual cost items such as
the amount of the annual percentage rate, creditors will be required to make
reimbursements. Similar corrective action is set forth in the supervisory
enforcement policy for signature violations, credit reporting violations, and
adverse action notification violations.
The problems presented to creditors by the Interagency Policy Statement
and the Supervisory Enforcement Policy could be major. For one thing,
neither of the policy statements provides for a "pattern or practice" finding
prior to the imposition of administrative remedies. A creditor, acting in good
faith and using written compliance standards that conform to ECOA, could
be required to take affirmative remedial action for an error committed in one
or several credit transactions. Another difficult provision of the policy statements is that they require creditors to identify problem loans. A few acts of
discrimination by one or several loan officers could require a large banking
system to make a system-wide review for other discriminatory acts of the same
nature. How such a system-wide check is to be prepared, particularly when
81. Thus violating regulation B, 12 C.F.R. §§ 202.4, 202.5(a).
82. Id.. §§ 202.4-202.7
83. Id., § 202.4 or § 202.6(b).
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information regarding race, national origin, and other protected bases cannot
be obtained or accumulated for non-real estate loans, is not disclosed by the
policy statements. Finally, the risk elements presented by the policy statements are great because creditors taking the type of corrective action
contemplated by the policy statements will not be insulated from private
litigation." This failure to provide for a termination of private civil actions
against creditors that take corrective action acting under an administrative
order presents a classic double jeopardy situation for affected creditors.
B. Litigation
There have continued to be few cases brought under the ECOA. As
indicated at the outset, the most significant decision in the past year was the
affirmance by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in the Beneficial
case. In this case, the Third Circuit let stand the important holding of the
district court that the Attorney General may not sue for the monetary
damages suffered by nonparties. This limitation of the power of the Attorney
General is quite important because that office would be a likely source of the
expertise needed to prepare a successful effects test lawsuit. Stated differently,
the type of statistical analysis that is required to bring an effects test case is
not likely to be possessed by private plaintiffs.
Other cases that are worthy of note involve a broad cross-section of ECOA
issues. In Nguyen v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc.,85 the District Court for
the Northern District of Texas held that the denial of credit by a creditor
because the applicant is not a citizen of the United States is not proscribed by
the ECOA. The court made a point of noting that no showing was made that
Vietnamese aliens such as the plaintiff were less favorably treated than other
groups of aliens. Presumably, had such a showing been made, the court would
have found at least an arguable theory of discrimination based on national
origin. The Nguyen decision seems to suggest that a creditor may adopt a
uniform system excluding all applicants who are not United States citizens.
To the extent that the Nguyen decision can be read as permitting such a
blanket refusal to deal with non-United States citizens, the decision runs
counter to section 202.6(b)(7) of regulation B, a section that seems to indicate
that an applicant's immigration status may be considered in evaluating a
credit risk, but cannot itself be an absolute barrier to credit.
The decision of the District Court for the Western District of Missouri in
Sayers v. General Motors Acceptance Corporation" raises interesting issues
in connection with the type of adverse action notification that is required by
regulation B. In the Sayers case, the GMAC representative apparently
84. This risk of double jeopardy previously existed under the Truth in Lending Act but was
substantially eliminated by provisions of the Truth in Lending Simplification Act. See § 130(b) of
the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(b).
85. 513 F. Supp. 1039 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
86. No. 79-0714 (W.D. Mo. 1981).
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misread the plaintiff's credit report to indicate that she was the subject of a
collection action. On being advised by the plaintiff that this reading was
incorrect, the GMAC supervisor did not correct the error as anticipated by
section 202.9(e) of regulation B and, therefore, GMAC was found to be in
violation of regulation B. Since the plaintiff applied to GMAC through an
automobile dealer and since this dealer was advised by GMAC of the
inaccurate information on the credit report, the Sayers court allowed the
plaintiff to recover damages as compensation for embarrassment, humiliation,
and mental distress.
The concern of credit applicants should be raised by the decision of the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Haynes v. Bank of Wedowee.87 This
decision dealt with a car loan made to a married woman as an individual. The
car loan was accelerated on account of the husband's bankruptcy. The
plaintiff and her husband maintained a joint checking account at the defendant bank and, therefore, the husband's bankruptcy could have resulted in the
loss of the checking account balance as a continuing source of protection to
the creditor. Even though the applicant did not rely on her husband's income
or assets in connection with her credit application, the court permitted an
acceleration of the loan because the creditor had relied on the jointly held
account. This shift from looking at the intent of the applicant to the intent of
the creditor in determining compliance with the provisions of regulation B
that deal with the appropriate treatment of the spouses of credit applicants
seems hard to justify.
IV. CREDIT REPORTING by Lewis H. Goldfarb* and C. Lee Peeler**
Since 1971, the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)88 has resulted in
remarkably little reported litigation compared to other statutes such as the
Truth in Lending Act. Recently, however, there has been several significant
appellate cases which have provided some important refinements in the
interpretation of the act.
A. Permissible Purposes for Use of Consumer Reports
In Heath v. Credit Bureau of Sheridan89 the Tenth Circuit became the
second appellate court to find a cause of action for consumers whose reports
are obtained without a permissible purpose. Heath alleged that his union had
obtained a credit report on him in order to " 'embarrass, humiliate and
discredit [Heath] in the eyes of the public, and more specifically, in the eyes of
87. 634 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1981).
*Member Virginia and District of Columbia bars.
**Member District of Columbia bar.
Authors' Note: The views expressed herein are solely the views of the authors and do not
necessarilyreflect the views of the Federal Trade Commission, any particularcommissioner, or
the Commission staff.
88. 15 U.S.C. § 1681.
89. 618 F.2d 693 (10th Cir. 1980).
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his coworkers and brother union members.' "" The district court dismissed
the complaint against both the credit bureau and the union for failure to state
a claim, on the theory that a report used for this purpose was not a "consumer
report" under the act. 91
In remanding the case for a new trial, the Tenth Circuit followed the lead of
the Ninth Circuit in Hansen v. Morgan,92 finding the credit report subject to
the act because it was clearly prepared and expected to be used in connection
with consumer credit transactions. Heath, however, had not alleged that the
union had used false pretenses to obtain the report and the Tenth Circuit
upheld the district court's dismissal of the complaint against the union. 9'
In another significant appellate decision implementing the act's limitations
on government access to credit information for law enforcement purposes,
United States v. TRW,9" the Ninth Circuit ruled that a grand jury subpoena
did not constitute an "order of the court" for the purposes of section 604(1)92
of FCRA and therefore a credit reporting agency had correctly refused to
provide a credit report in response to a grand jury subpoena. Although there
are conflicting lower court decisions on this issue,96 the Ninth Circuit's opinion
is the first guidance from an appellate court.
B. Reasonable Procedures to Ensure Accuracy
Section 607(b) 97 of FCRA, which requires consumer reporting agencies to
follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy, has also
produced some important new decisions. One potentially signficant case,
Bryant v. TRW,99 was recently argued on appeal in the Sixth Circuit. Bryant
concerns a mortgage report which the plaintiff alleged erroneously indicated
that four of his accounts were delinquent. Moreover, the plaintiff attempted to
show that the report was but one of a series of inaccurate reports each
containing different and sometimes conflicting information.
In defense, the credit bureau argued, in part, that it had correctly transcribed the information supplied by the credit grantors. Thus, the bureau
argued the court should find that as a matter of law the bureau had no liability
for the erroneous information. The trial judge, while admitting that the

90. Id. at 694.
91. Cf.Henry v. Forbes, 433 F. Supp. 5 (D. Minn. 1976).
92. 582 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1978).
93. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681q. The prohibition against obtaining information under false
pretenses is the only requirement that can be violated by a user who obtains a report without a
permissible purpose. The bulk of the legal responsibility for preventing unauthorized access falls
on the consumer reporting agency.
94. 633 F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1980), petition for rehearing denied.
95. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b.
96. Compare In re TRW, 460 F. Supp. 1007 (E.D. Mich. 1978) with In re Credit Information
Corp., 457 F. Supp. 969 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
97. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b).
98. 48 F. Supp. 1234 (E.D. Mich. 1980), appeal pending.
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bureau's argument had "superficial appeal," 9 9 rejected the defendant's legal
position as well as the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the
jury's verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The court held that, on the record of the
case, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that the bureau's procedures
were "entirely inadequate" for dealing with a consumer who the bureau knew
had a history of difficulty with creditors reporting inaccurate information and
who had personally alerted the bureau that the information it was about to
report was inaccurate."'
Because of its unique facts, the Bryant decision itself will have little direct
precedential value as to the procedures which should be followed in preparing
consumer reports. However, the legal principle established by Bryant, if
affirmed on appeal, will establish a significant legal precedent even though
most consumer reporting agencies already appear to maintain some procedures to screen out erroneous subscriber input.
A second major appellate decision on section 607(b) involves an appeal by a
consumer from an adverse jury verdict. In Colletti v. Credit Bureau Services, ' the consumer disputed the accuracy of her credit report, obtained a
correction, and then again became delinquent in her payments. Upon learning
that her report again reflected that she was delinquent, she paid the account in
full and filed suit claiming that the bureau had violated section 607(b) of the
act by reporting false, inaccurate, and incomplete information and by not
taking steps to ensure the accuracy of its reports after being advised that she
disputed the information. In reviewing the jury's finding that the bureau had
followed reasonable procedure, the court noted that it found ample evidence to
support the jury's verdict. Colletti is also notable in that it is the second circuit
court to adopt the position that a credit bureau's failure to check the current
status of in-file information before making a subsequent report does not
violate the Fair Credit Reporting Act.' °
The broad latitude for jury findings under section 607(b) also emphasizes
the need for clear jury instructions. One problem which may arise is illustrated by Thornton v. Equifax,' " in which the Eighth Circuit reversed a jury
verdict awarding the plaintiffs $5,000 in actual damages and $250,000 in
punitive damages. The appellate court held that the trial court's instructions
had confused the standard for recovery under the FCRA with that provided
by Arkansas for common law libel actions.
A final significant development under section 607(b) was the Federal Trade
Commission's decision, In re Equifax,04 which ended an administrative
enforcement proceeding begun in 1974. Although the appeal involved alleged
99. Id. at 1240.
100. Id. at 1239.
101. 644 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1981).
102. Id. at 1151.
103. 619 F.2d 700 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied 449 U.S. 835 (1980).
104. 96 F.T.C. 844, 5 Cons. Credit Guide (CCH) 97,270 (1980), appeal pending.
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violations of five separate provisions of FCRA, as well as separate allegations
under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, the major focus of the
trial and appeal was clearly on the section 607(b) allegations. On appeal the
Commission found that the staff had not shown that Equifax's system for
requiring its investigators to produce a specified number of reports ("production quotas") violated section 670(b). However, the Commission did find that
Equifax's "quality audits" (a system which set objectives for the amount of
adverse information the company believed its investigators should be including in their reports) did violate the act. Of particular importance to future
cases was the Commission's restatement of section 607(b):
We construe section (607(b) to require reporting agencies to do whatever
is reasonable under the circumstances to minimize the chances that
consumers will be harmed by inaccurate reporting. If an agency employs
a procedure which does not offer the best assurance of producing the most
accurate reports, it ought to have a strong justification for doing so. 1°5
The section 607(b) portion of the Equifax case is currently on appeal in the
Eleventh Circuit.
C. Constitutionality of the FCRA
At the time the Fair Credit Reporting Act was enacted, commercial speech
was often thought not to enjoy First Amendment protections. In Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,01 6 however,
the Supreme Court made it clear that commercial speech was entitled to at
least some protection under the First Amendment, and its more recent
decision in Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corporationv. Public Service
Commission"7 sets out a four-part test under which the constitutionality of
laws regulating commercial speech will be evaluated.
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Equifax Services v.
Cohen,' a suit seeking to enjoin enforcement of that state's Fair Credit
Reporting Act, is the first decision to address the constitutionality of FCRA
after the Virginia Pharmacy and Central Hudson decisions. In Cohen, the
Maine court applied the four-part Central Hudson test to invalidate provisions of the Maine statute that (1) require users of investigative consumer
reports to obtain the consumer's written authorization before obtaining a
report; (2) prohibit reporting of information about the consumer's race,
religion, color, sexual preference or orientation, or political affiliation; (3)
prohibit the reporting of irrelevant information; and (4) prohibit the reporting
of specific categories of obsolete information.
105. Id. at 1050-51, 5 Cons. Cred. Guide (CCH) at 86,688.

106. 425 U.S. 748, 96 S. Ct. 1817 (1976).
107. 447 U.S. 557, 100 S. Ct. 2343 (1980).
108. 420 A.2d 189 (Me. 1980), cert. denied 450 U.S. 916 (1981), 101 S. Ct. 1360 (1981).
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From the standpoint of the federal law, the Cohen case is most significant in
invalidating a subsection of the Maine statute that closely parallels the federal
statute's restriction on the distribution of obsolete information. In addition,
while the Cohen court found facially valid a provision of the Maine statute
which is almost identical to the federal law's restriction on the permissible
purposes for which reports can be used, the court strongly suggested that it
might find such restrictions on distribution unconstitutional as applied in a
particular case.
The Cohen case is, of course, not the last word on the constitutionality of the
Fair Credit Reporting Act. The opinion itself readily admits of two limitations. First, the parties in the case agreed that the conduct regulated by the
Maine statute was commercial speech so the court was not called on to decide
that question. Previous Supreme Court cases dealing with this subject have
dealt with advertising rather than the activity of consumer reporting agencies.
Secondly, the Cohen case was tried before the Central Hudson decision which
set up its four-part test for the constitutionality of regulations of commercial
speech, and the court makes clear that it was basing its decision only on the
record before it. Finally, the Maine court adopted a very restrictive view of the
scope of a state's interest in preserving its citizens' personal privacy. 09
Nevertheless, the Cohen decision is the first to analyze the constitutionality of
several major provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act and, at the very
least, suggests an agenda for future litigation.
V. DEBT COLLECTION by Barbara S. Leonard*
In the fourth year of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 10
judicial interpretations have continued to clarify key substantive provisions,
while the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has somewhat softened its
previously vigorous enforcement stance. The most controversial provisions of
the act appear to be those regarding liability and damages.
A. Substantive Provisions
Litigation under the substantive provisions remains centered on what
conduct constitutes harassment in violation of section 1692d and what are
false or misleading representations in violation of section 1692e. Before
deciding the legality of specific conduct, one court addressed the relevant
standard of debtor susceptibility to collection practices. Looking to legislative
history, which the court concluded encompassed FTC rulings prior to the
enactment of the FDCPA, the court in Bingham v. Collection Bureau, Inc.,"'
applied the standard of "whether it is more likely so than not so that debtors
109. Id. at 199-200. Compare Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 71 S. Ct. 920 (1951).
*Member of the District of Columbia and Illinois bars.
110. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o (1977).
111. Bingham v. Collection Bureau, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 864 (D.N.D. 1981).
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on the low side of reasonable capacity who read a given notice or hear a given
statement read into the message oppressiveness, falsehood, or threat."'' 2
Applying this test, the court found that fourteen phone calls at reasonable
times in one month did not rise to the level of harassment since some payments
resulted and the collector was not told to cease communication. Nor does the
collector's mention of the possibility and consequences of a lawsuit violate the
FDCPA. But the use of an alias, an immediate call back after the debtor hung
up, and an inquiry into personal matters such as the ability*to afford children,
do have a natural consequence to harass." 3 In another case a form letter
suggesting a debtor lacks the common sense to handle her financial affairs was
found to violate the act when in fact she had called the collector in response to
4
an earlier letter and her call had not been returned.1
The court in Bingham'15 also found that when a collection agency sends
notices referring to the creditor as "our member" a false implication is made
that there is a wide distribution of credit information. However, the phrase
"avoid further action" creates no false implications, nor is "final notice-last
chance" deceptive when the agency intends to follow the notice with an
16
aggressive telephone effort.
B. Liability and Damages
The FDCPA permits the awarding of actual damages as well as additional
damages of up to $1,000." 7 The court must consider, among other relevant
factors, the frequency and persistence of the noncompliance by the collector,
the nature of the noncompliance, and the extent to which it was intentional."'
A collector may escape liability if it can show that the violation was
unintentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid such errors.1 9
In Harvey v. United Adjusters,10 the plaintiff argued that the statute
should be interpreted to provide for statutory damages of up to $1,000 per
communication, on the theory that once the initial violative contract is made
the collector has no incentive to cease the activity. The court, however, found
that the frequency of the noncompliance is a factor in determining the amount
of statutory damages and that the $1,000 maximum recovery per action does
2
not defeat the purpose of the act.1 1

112. Id. at 871.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 873.
Harvey v. United Adjusters, 509 F. Supp. 1218 (D. Or. 1981).
Bingham v. Collection Bureau, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 864 (D.N.D. 1981).
Id. at 872.
15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a).
15 U.S.C. § 1692k(b).
15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c).
Harvey v. United Adjusters, 509 F. Supp. 1218 (D. Or. 1981).
Id. at 1222.
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Another factor affecting the award of damages is the maintenance of
procedures reasonably adapted to avoid errors that result in violations. One
such acceptable procedure is a program of constant-on-the-job training
coupled with telephone monitoring, supervision, and reference to a standardized manual.' 22 According to the court, however, this procedure only showed
that the violations were unintentional and not that they were bona fide errors,
so liability still attached."'
On the question of actual damages, the Bingham court specifically rejected
as too weak the testimony of a psychologist based on two hours of observation
of the plaintiff which occurred a substantial time after the collection efforts
had stopped. The court concluded that the plaintiff had suffered no permanent
ill effects, but since she was of the group to be protected and did suffer injury,
actual damages of $1,000 were awarded." 4 The plaintiff's husband was also
awarded $100 for loss of consortium. Statutory damages of $400 were
assessed because while the violations were not frequent or persistent, they
were intentional.
Another court awarded actual damages on the theory that the plaintiff
would have been so entitled in an action for the intentional infliction of
emotional distress."' The violation, failure to cease communication when so
requested by the debtor, involved a statutory provision the court found
6
designed to prevent harassment of the debtor *through repeated contacts."1
Actual damages of $100 were awarded on the basis that while the defendant
lacked the specific intent to inflict emotional distress it did intend to place the
calls with the knowledge that the debtor had requested an end to the
communications. The court also considered that the plaintiff, a lawyer, was
more indignant than distressed. In awarding $250 in additional damages, the
court considered, among other factors, the legal advice available to the
defendant.
C. Federal Trade Commission Enforcement
Two debt collectors paid civil penalties in early 1981 for alleged FDCPA
violations. One New York chain of agencies was assessed a $90,000 civil
penalty under a consent judgment for, among other allegations, falsely
threatening arrest and property or wage attachment." 7 The FTC agreed to
allow payment over three years, but the agencies are prohibited from using
their assets as collateral for loans, making unsecured loans to officers, or filing
bankruptcy without notice to the FTC. Another New York agency, Credit
122. Bingham v. Collection Bureau, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 864 (D.N.D. 1981).
123. Id. at 874. The use of telephone aliases was a bona fide error, however, since the collector
assumed it was in compliance with the law on the use of telephone aliases.
124. Id. at 875. The injury suffered is not specified.
125. Carrigan v. Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 468 (N.D. Ga. 1980): No
showing of contemporaneous physical harm is necessary in Georgia.
126. Id. at 470.
127. United States v. Universal Collection Bureau, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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Rating Bureau, Inc., was charged a $10,000 civil penalty and required to
change its name, 28 because it allegedly falsely implied that it was a consumer
reporting agency in violation of FDCPA section 1692e(16).
The FTC also filed a complaint against the Universal Church of Jesus
Christ, its minister Sly, and its bureau of collections, seeking injunctive relief
and a refund of "collection fees" that had been imposed on consumer
debtors.' 9 The complaint charged that the bureau of collections, an unincorporated division of the church, violated several provisions of the FDCPA as
well as engaged in a variety of other deceptive practices. The most grievous
practice was that of advising debtors that the bureau would negotiate a
settlement between them and their creditors, for which a fee of 25 percent of
the debt was added.
Additional violations included such practices as sending dunning notices
that resembled telegrams or featured a gavel-wielding judge and scales of
justice, threatening unintended legal action, and advising consumers that as
good Christians they should pay even unjust debts.
Affirming its position that creditors who violate the FDCPA in principle
(but who are not debt collectors under the act) may nevertheless be held liable
under section 5 of the FTC Act, the FTC signed a consent agreement with the
nationwide mail-order retailer, Aldens, Inc., prohibiting Aldens from contacting third parties in its efforts to collect from delinquent customers.'3 ° A
provision to that effect will be added to the company's charge account
agreements. Skip-tracing is permitted, but only under the parameters specified in the order. Aldens is additionally prohibited from contacting customers
at unusual times or places or when the customers have requested that
communications cease.
In advisory action, the FTC announced that in the future more injunctive
relief and smaller civil penalties would be sought from FDCPA violators.' 3'
An FTC spokesman acknowledged complaints that civil penalties of over
$75,000 were out of proportion to the size of the collection agency and
indicated that future penalties would be in the $20,000 to $40,000 range.'32
Nor will the FTC attempt to hold creditors liable for their selection of debt
collectors. Its enforcement efforts will be concentrated on key provisions of the
FDCPA such as creditors posing as independent collection agencies, the
imposition of unauthorized collection fees, illegal contacts with third parties,
and deprivation of consumers' self-help rights under the Act.'33
In other staff advisory letters the FTC stated that when employees of a
collector work temporarily in a creditor's office using the creditor's name there
128. United States v. Credit Rating Bureau, Inc. (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
129. FTC v. Sly (N.D. Ala. 1981). Since no civil penalties were sought, the FTC filed the
complaint in its own name.
130. As reported in Washington Credit Letter, Aug. 3, 1981, at 5-6.
131. FTC 1980 Annual Report to Congress.
132. As reported in the Washington Credit Letter, March 2, 1981.
133. Id.
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is little likelihood of deception and the collector is therefore not subject to the
act."' Similarly exempt is a service company that sends out notices for an
attorney unless the attorney is nothing more than a conduit between a creditor
and collector. In the latter case, both the attorney and the collector violate the
act.13 In another opinion concerning the attorney-collector relationship, the
FTC found that an agency that merely refers claims to an attorney for legal
action need not send validation notices to the debtor." 6 The notice must be
sent, however, if the attorney is the agent for the collector rather than the
creditor. The FTC also warned that an agency lending its name or logo to a
creditor may be guilty of creating a false implication that a third party is
participating in the collection efforts.137
Vl. FTC RULEMAKING AND ENFORCEMENT by James K. LeValley*
The past year was frustrating for the Federal Trade Commission insofar as
creditor regulation was concerned. The Commission made no progress at the
rulemaking level with either its proposed Credit Practices Trade Regulation
Rule"3 8 or with its proposed amendments to the so-called Holder Rule. 3 9 Its
efforts to regulate credit practices by means of the adjudicatory process were
also thwarted in the courts.
The Commission did finalize its long-pending used car rule-officially the
Trade Regulation Rule on Sale of Used Motor Vehicles" 4 -calling for dealers
to disclose warranty coverages and to reveal known defects through a windowsticker "buyer's guide." But that rule must be submitted for congressional
review and possible veto in the second session of the Ninety-seventh Congress.1 41 Thus, if the rule survives at all, it will not be effective until late 1982
at the earliest. It is also possible that the FTC will make changes in the rule
before it is resubmitted to Congress, in an effort to blunt industry criticisms
and draw legislative support.

134. Washington Credit Letter Oct. 20, 1980, at 2-3.
135. Washington Credit Letter, June 15, 1981, at 6.
136. Washington Credit Letter, Aug. 24, 1981, at 3.
137. Washington Credit Letter, Jan. 5, 1981, at 3.
*Member of the Arizona and Iowa bars.
138. 40 Fed. Reg. 16,347 (1975). For a discussion of the proposed rule and subsequent
developments, see 36 Bus. Law. 1252 (1981).
139. 44 Fed. Reg. 65,771 (1979). The full name of this rule is the Trade Regulation Rule on
Preservation of Consumer Claims and Defenses. For a discussion of the proposed amendments,
see 35 Bus. Law. 1318 (1980).
140. 46 Fed. Reg. 41,327 (1981) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 455). The Commission was
directed to issue a rule dealing with "warranties and warranty practices in connection with the
sale of used motor vehicles" by §.109(b) of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act of 1975, 15 U.S.C.
2309(b).
141. Under § 21 of the Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-252, 94 Stat. 374, a Commission rule becomes effective after a 90-day congressional review
period unless both Houses of Congress pass resolutions of disapproval. For background on this
legislative veto, see 36 Bus. Law. 1248-49 (1981).
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Deference to the conservative political mood with which the Congress has
been seized since the last elections may explain the Commission's failure to
take final action on either the proposed Credit Practices Rule or on its
proposed amendments to the Holder Rule. In any event, the Commission did
not move either proposal any closer to promulgation during 1981.
The Commission's staff was predicting in November of 1981 that it would
make its final recommendation to the Commission on the Credit Practices
Rule in February of 1982, with oral presentation scheduled for March of 1982
and Commission consideration set for April of 1982.142 No date had been
projected for final Commission action as of December 1981.
Final Commission action on the proposed amendments to the Holder Rule
is tentatively set for March of 1982.11 If history has any predictive value,
however, another postponement seems likely.
The Commission was also frustrated in its efforts to outlaw certain
widespread credit practices by use of its adjudicatory powers. In FordMotor
Co. v. FTC,44 the Ninth Circuit set aside a Commission order finding an
automobile dealer's repossession practices to be in violation of section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act. The court held that the Commission exceeded its authority when it chose adjudication, rather than rulemaking, as its
vehicle to establish a broad new standard for repossession and resale practices.
The adjudication began in 1976 as an action against Francis Ford, Inc., an
automobile dealer; Ford Motor Company; and Ford Motor Credit Company. 45 Parallel proceedings were commenced against Chrysler Corporation
and General Motors Corporation, their finance subsidiaries, and two of their
dealers. Eventually, all of the respondents settled with the Commission by
means of a consent order, except for Francis Ford. Francis declined to settle
and the case proceeded to a full adjudication hearing. At issue was the Ford
dealer's practice in accounting to debtors for the value of their repossessed
vehicles and any surplus upon resale. Francis Ford, allegedly following
industry practices, credited the debtor with the wholesale value of the car,
charged for both direct (i.e., refurbishing) and indirect (i.e., overhead and lost
profits) expenses connected with the repossession and resale, and retained any
surplus realized. The Commission found Francis Ford's practice to be contrary to the Oregon statute corresponding to Uniform Commercial Code
section 9-504 and, therefore, an unfair trade practice under section 5.
In setting aside the Commission's order, the court held that issues of such
widespread application were more appropriately addressed in a rulemaking
forum, where all interested parties could appear and make their views known.
The court was wholly unpersuaded by the Commission's argument that the
effect of the Francis Ford case was limited to the state of Oregon, noting that
142.
143.
144.
145.

46 Fed. Reg. 54,871 (1981).
46 Fed. Reg. 54,868 (1981).
654 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1981).
For background, see 35 Bus. Law. 1324 (1980).
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the FTC itself had appended a "Synopsis of Determination" to its order
advising other automobile dealerships of the results of the adjudication. The
court also noted the Commission's pending consideration of the proposed

Credit Practices Rule, which would address similar issues related to repossessions in a deficiency context.' Since forty-nine states had adopted provisions
virtually identical to the Oregon statute at issue, allowing the FTC order to
stand "would create a national interpretation of U.C.C. Section 9-504 and in
effect enact the precise rule the FTC has proposed, but not yet promul'
gated."147
The Ford Motor Co. decision prescribes outer limitations on the ability of
the Commission to avoid the procedural, substantive, and political quagmires

of the rulemaking process by selective "test case" litigation. As such, it
presents a potentially significant obstacle to the Commission in its efforts to
maintain an aggressive posture in the area of consumer credit.

146. Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 654 F.2d at 601. The FTC could have formulated its position on
U.C.C. § 9-504 and its application to the credit practices of car dealerships in its proposed trade
rule on credit practices. It did not do so. The pending rulemaking proceeding and this
adjudication seek to remedy, more or less, the same credit practices. Although the former is
directed against the practices, inter alia, of car dealers in their accounting of deficiencies, and the
latter is directed against a car dealer by reason of his practices in failing to account for surpluses,
both matters are covered by U.C.C. § 9-504. If the rule for deficiencies is thought by the FTC to
be "appropriately addressed by rulemaking," it should also address the problem of accounting for
surpluses by a rulemaking proceeding, and not by adjudication.
147. Id. at 602.

